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Abstract
Electronic transfer of prescriptions is an essential element of electronic medications management. Unfortunately,
current manual and preliminary electronic transfer of prescription methods are not patient focussed, leading to a
suboptimal solution for the patient. This is increasingly relevant in the push for more patient engagement in their
own healthcare. The area is highly controlled by legislation and regulation. Through research and an analysis of
the possible methods to improve and personalise electronic transfer of prescriptions, this paper provides an
overview of these conclusions, and presents an alternative technical solution. The solution has been derived from
a number of experiments in data transfer techniques using a mobile phone. The paper explains how this meets the
current regulations and legislation, as well as providing a patient centred approach to the problem. Ultimately,
healthcare outcomes will improve where patients are given the opportunity and the tools to better engage in their
own healthcare management, and secure electronic transfer of prescriptions with patient access to their own
medication lists may improve compliance and reduce healthcare costs.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of electronic prescription (eTP) is the lifeblood of eHealth and in improving quality of care through
better medication compliance, improved prescribing accuracy and efficiency while reducing the adverse drug
events. In fact, electronic prescribing is an essential initial step of the electronic Medication Management (eMM)
program which primarily focuses on improving medication-related outcomes through better quality and
availability of medications-related healthcare information (“NEHTA Blueprint V2”, 2011). Having an effective
medication management system in place improves medication compliance and reduces adverse drug events. A
recent study indicates almost 70,000 hospital admissions per year are associated with adverse drug events and
poor medication compliance/adherence. This significantly contributes to having undesirable patient outcomes
such as hospital readmission or even loss of life (White, 2015). The use of eTP enables eMM to reduce these
undesirable outcomes and to prevent excessive use of healthcare expenditure while providing better patient
safety.
Current eTP implementation converts the conventional manual prescription process/model to a digital equivalent
using two Prescription Exchange Services (PES), Script Exchange from eRx and Script Vault from MediSecure
(Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a). Using these PES services, prescribers can upload the electronic copy of
the prescription for later download and dispense by the pharmacies. The use of electronic prescription exchange
not only connects the two major healthcare providers such as clinicians and pharmacists, but it also paves the
way to create a national medication repository. Such a repository would allow clinicians, pharmacists, aged care
facilities and hospitals to see a combined list of prescribed and dispensed medications regardless of how many
different doctors and pharmacies the patient has visited. However, current implementation of eTP is an
expensive operation to maintain as an ongoing process for the nation. The associated electronic prescription fees
for each prescription downloaded from PES used to be as much as AU$ 0.85 prior to achieving the
interoperability between the two PES services. Some negotiations and cooperation between the Commonwealth,
the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators managed to reduce the electronic prescription fees to AU$ 0.15
per eligible prescription. This electronic prescription fees has, so far, been subsidised by the Commonwealth
through a series of Community Pharmacy Agreements (CPA). However, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix-B of the
current agreement, Sixth Community Pharmacy Agreement (6CPA), states that funding from 1st July 2016 and
onwards will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment body
as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Since the eligibility criteria for this
subsidy can be tightened or amended to the disadvantages of the pharmacies (i.e. current eTP implementation
being a pharmacy user-pay system) ("FAQs", 2016), exploration of cheaper alternatives with comparable
security measures to the current use of eTP is commendable.
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WHAT ETP STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS MANDATES VS CURRENT
ETPIMPLEMENTATION
There are numerous standards and mandates regulating the management of medications in Australia. These
include the Electronic Transaction Act (ETA) and various Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods. They have been repealed and/or amended at the Commonwealth as well as State and
Territory level to accommodate the implementation of eTP in Australian healthcare. Figure 1 briefly depicts how
these Acts and Regulations fit together to enable the current eTP implementation. It also demonstrates how the
legislation and regulations in Australia are constructed and the complexity of this construction for eTP. The
outermost circle represents the encompassing regulation for the entire nation. The next inner circle defines the
regulations for each State and Territory amended as per jurisdictional legislative requirements. These two circles
enable the use of electronic transactions at national, state and territory levels thus making the use of eTP and
other electronic transactions possible. The third circle lists Acts and Regulations governing the Poisons and
Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction which play a major role in enabling the use of eTP. The centre circle
contains various standards and specifications developed reflecting those national and jurisdictional legislative
requirements. It is named Dante’s 4 circles of eTP as the closer the circle is to the centre of the diagram the more
eTP specific it becomes in a similar way the 14th century poet Dante Alighieri’s depiction of nine circles of hell
(i.e. lower circles are for more severe sins).
(Commonwealth)
Electronic Transaction Act 1999

eTP related

Medicines, Poisons and Health (Drugs and
Therapeutic Goods Act Poisons) Regulation
2012 1996

Poision Act 1964
Poisons Regulation
1965

Implementation



ATS 4888.1 – 6 (2013)
AS 4700.3 (2014)
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Poisons
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Poisons and
Therapeutic
Goods Regulation
2008
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Figure 1. Dante’s 4 circles of eTP
The Commonwealth Electronic Transaction Act 1999 facilitates the use of electronic means and enables the use
of electronic communications in dealings with government, business and community for the future economic and
social prosperity of Australia. Various States and Territories amend/adopt this overarching Act to suit their
jurisdictional legislative requirements. This jurisdictional ETA and various Acts and Regulations governing the
Poisons and Therapeutic Goods for each jurisdiction dictate the requirements for eTP implementation in that
jurisdiction. After all the eTP requirements of all jurisdictions have been considered, various standards and

53

specifications have been developed reflecting those requirements. Among these related standards and
specifications, ATS4888 series and AS4700.3 primarily govern the implementation of eTP. Current eTP
implementation developed in compliance with these standards and specifications is briefly depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Current electronic prescription transfer model using PES (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a)
Although ATS4888.2 of the ATS4888 series particularly emphasizes on the platform independent model, it also
includes specific details on securing electronic prescription information from the security of the data-at-rest
perspective. It mandates that the electronic prescription to be encrypted using a symmetric key derived from the
Document Access Key (DAK) before being stored on PES. DAK is the barcode printed on the paper prescription
created by any eTP enabled electronic prescribing system. The current eTP implementation also makes use of
DAK for authorizing access to the prescription stored on the PES and decrypting it after being downloaded from
PES. In addition, section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2 strictly prohibits storing of DAK or any of its derived key on
any stable storage (i.e. non-volatile storage) unless they have been encrypted using 128 bit encryption. Further
details on securing electronic prescription from the security of data-at-rest perspective can be found in sections
5.3.3 - 5.3.4, 5.3.6 - 5.3.7 and 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2. These sections provide an overview of the security
mechanism implemented using the DAK for safeguarding prescription information. Figure 3 briefly illustrates
how this security mechanism works.

Figure 3: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription with PES (Standards Australia, 2013, Figure 19)
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On the other hand, although ATS4888.2 contains specific details on securing prescription information from
security of data-at-rest perspective, it mentions very little on securing the prescription information from data-intransit (i.e. data in motion) perspective. Both sections 5.3.5 and 7.3.3 of ATS4888.2 mention that securing
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective entirely relies on the security and encryption
mechanism of the implementation platform and the eTP technical specification for that platform. Research on
eTP to date has not encountered any other standard or specification which includes further details on securing
prescription information from data-in-transit perspective. Security in this context appears to be solely relying on
existing industrial standards and best practices. Current implementation of eTP (i.e. both PES services)
implements the simple Subscriber-Provider pattern instead of publishing their service endpoints using Endpoint
Location Services (ELS) service infrastructure (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2016). Moreover, current eTP
implementation does not utilize other eHealth infrastructural components such as Health Identifiers (HI)
Services. Unfortunately, this leaves current eTP implementation considerable room for future improvement from
security perspective.
Another disadvantage of the current eTP is its associated ongoing cost, the electronic prescription fees. Although
the combined effort of the Commonwealth, the Pharmacy Guild and the two PES operators could reduce the fees
to AU$ 0.15 per eligible prescription, it is still a taxing expenditure for the nation on the long run. A recent
survey by eRx found that pharmacies using eRx are dispensing 753,000 electronic prescriptions per day with up
to 25 prescriptions per second during peak periods. When dispensing 753,000 prescriptions per day, it will cost
the nation AU$ 112,950 a day for electronic prescription fees alone.

Figure 4. Number of prescriptions over 10 year’s period

Figure 5. PBS expenditure over 10 year’s period
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Using statistics from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme website, figure 4 and 5 depicts the number of
prescriptions and PBS expenditure over the past 10 years. Based on figure 4 and 5, it is evident that although the
PBS expenditure fluctuate slightly, the number of prescriptions increased steadily over the decade.
Unfortunately, this indicates that unless less expensive alternatives are explored and utilized, the on-going
expense associated with the use of electronic prescription will only cost more in future with increase in volume.
At present, electronic prescription fees has been subsidised by the Commonwealth through a series of
Community Pharmacy Agreements. However, despite the fact that current eTP implementation being designed
as a pharmacy user-pay system ("FAQs", 2016), which party (among prescriber, dispenser and patient) will
actually be liable to pay for this on-going cost when it is no longer subsidised by the Commonwealth and the
ramification of this potential change is yet to be witnessed.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MOBILE SOLUTION
The proposed mobile electronic prescription transfer application was designed to be a cheaper, if not completely
cost-free, alternative with comparable security measures to the current eTP implementation using PES. This
proposed solution makes use of the patient’s smartphone as the secured transfer mechanism for transferring
electronic prescription instead of using PES. Figure 6 roughly depicts how this model works and its simplified
operations using the patient’s smartphone in place of PES services whilst the rest of the operations remain the
same as in the current eTP system.

Figure 6: Electronic prescription transfer model using smartphones (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015a)
In securing the prescription information from the security of data-at-rest perspective, this model also makes use
of DAK for encrypting the electronic prescription prior to transfer (i.e. to the patient’s mobile device) and
decrypting at the pharmacy end. However, in this model, the prescriber’s Electronic Prescribing System (EPS)
also transfers the DAK together with the electronic prescription to the patient’s smartphone for storage and
transportation instead of using PES. The DAK is then encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption, in
compliance with the section 7.3.3 of the ATS4888.2, by the mobile electronic prescription transfer application
prior to being stored on the smartphone. Upon arriving at the pharmacy, the mobile electronic prescription
transfer application on the smartphone decrypts the DAK and transfers it together with the electronic
prescription to the pharmacy’s eTP enabled Electronic Dispensing System (EDS). This transfer is to be done via
Bluetooth communication although earlier research was conducted with the intention of using NFC technology
instead. Once both the DAK and electronic prescription have been transferred to the pharmacy’s EDS system,
the rest of the eTP operations such as decrypting the prescription using DAK, dispensing the medication and
updating the National Prescriptions and Dispense Repository (NPDR) will continue in the same way as if in the
current eTP implementation (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). For the repeat prescription scenario, the
pharmacy’s EDS will update the prescription information on the smartphone via the mobile electronic
prescription transfer application. This model is designed to have minimal impact on the prescriber’s EPS and
dispenser’s EDS systems in straightforward operations (i.e. simple prescribe and dispense scenario with no
script-owing or script-request). How this proposed model’s security mechanism works and how it differs from
the one using PES can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: DAK usage for storage and retrieval of prescription in proposed approach (Htat, Williams, &
McCauley, 2015b)
Since the prescription information is stored on the patient’s smartphone, despite both the DAK and the electronic
prescription being securely encrypted, it is still vulnerable to loss due to loss of the device on which it is stored.
To ensure this sensitive information does not fall into the wrong hand, the remote data-wipe feature can be
implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application using Cloud-to-Device-Messaging
(C2DM) from Google on Android platform, Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) on iOS platform and Windows
Push Notification Services (WNS) on Windows phone platform. This will enable the device owner to remotely
delete the prescription data stored on the device. Currently all major mobile OS platforms such as Android, iOS
and Windows support remote wipe features for scenario like this.
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, this proposed model relies on the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security
measures and governing standards for securing the prescription information in a very similar way current PES
implementation relies on the implementation platform and its relevant standards for the security of the data in
transit (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b).

DISCUSSION
The primary objective of the proposed mobile solution is to provide a cheaper, if not completely cost-free,
alternative with comparable security measures. Therefore, the proposed alternative mobile solution intends to
achieve the same level of security assurance as the current eTP implementation using PES by fulfilling the same
security requirements mandated by the same standards and specifications.
Being a national eHealth facility, current implementation of eTP using PES is considered to have complied with
the legislative requirements of all the jurisdictions within Australia. However, the study on how it complies with
those requirements and to which extent it complies with those requirements leads to interesting findings. For
instance, whilst sections 32A, 32B and Appendix-K of the Western Australia’s Poisons Regulation 1965
describes the fairly detailed criteria of an approved electronic prescribing system by CEO, the clause "in a
manner of writing approved by the Secretary." in section 26 (1) (b) of the Victoria's Drugs, Poisons and
Controlled Substances Regulations 2006 implies the use of electronic prescribing without further details on it.

57

Moreover, whilst the sections 37 (1A) (1B) and 51 (1A) (1B) (1C) of the Western Australia’s Poisons
Regulation 1965 explicitly state the exemption from the requirement of prescriber’s signature on electronic
prescriptions, sections 33 (5) and 34 (3) of the South Australia’s Controlled Substances (Poisons) Regulations
2011 only mention that prescribers with adequate arrangements for the electronic transmission of prescriptions
are permitted to transmit prescriptions electronically and it will be deemed to have been signed. Whilst one Act
or regulation dictates something explicitly, the others imply the same meaning using somewhat catch-all
statements and vice versa. Therefore, from the legislative approval/acceptance perspective, it is expected that the
proposed mobile solution will be accepted as a viable alternative if it complies with all the same standards and
specifications as the current eTP using PES.
From the security of the data-at-rest perspective, the proposed solution also makes use of the symmetric
encryption key derived from the DAK for securing the electronic prescription in the same way current eTP
implementation using PES services does. This limits the impact of the change in transfer mechanism (i.e.
patient’s smartphone instead PES) on other components of the eTP process such as prescribing, dispensing and
updating NPDR etc. Then, in the proposed solution, the DAK is encrypted using a 128 bit symmetric encryption
according to section 7.3.3 (i.e. Data Security Conformance Points) of the ATS4888.2 before being stored on the
mobile device (Htat, Williams, & McCauley, 2015b). Since the proposed solution uses the same DAK for
securing the electronic prescription and the DAK itself is stored encrypted according to the relevant security
mandates, the proposed solution’s security measures are so far comparable to those of the current approach using
PES. Moreover, in the same way the DAK scanned from the paper prescription is used for authorizing the
pharmacy access to the prescription stored on the PES in the current eTP implementation, the DAK transferred
from the mobile electronic prescription transfer application (i.e. the application from patient smartphone to the
pharmacy’s EDS) authorizes the pharmacy to access the electronic prescription stored on the patient’s
smartphone. Therefore, this authorisation mechanism of the proposed solution is also comparable to the current
one being used.
From the security of the data-in-transit perspective, the Bluetooth’s inbuilt security measures and governing
standards upon which this proposed model depends on for securing the prescription information are well
accepted by the industry and strictly governed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) and IEEE standard
802.15.1-2005. With strict governance by these two reputable authority bodies (i.e. Bluetooth SIG and IEEE),
the implementation platform specific security measures of the proposed model (i.e. using Bluetooth) can be
considered comparable to those of the current eTP implementation using the Internet.
Current eTP implementation using PES does not use any of the existing eHealth infrastructural components such
as SMD, ELS and HI services although they can be effectively incorporated for better security, identification
mechanism, consistency and reliability. Since the current approach using PES does not set very high standards
for the proposed prescription transfer approach to live up to, this makes the proposed solution easier to
implement and more acceptable to the industry. Although the primary objective of the proposed solution is to be
a cheaper alternative with comparable security measures to the current approach using PES, it also has a few
additional advantages over the current approach. First, this proposed solution puts the user in control of their
sensitive information and allows them to prevent undesirable secondary use of that information by third parties.
In addition, some useful features such as prescription expiration alert, last repeat alert, drug allergy alert and alert
for harmful doses can also be implemented as part of the mobile electronic prescription transfer application. The
ability to transfer the full history of patient’s medication from the patient’s mobile phone directly into the
hospital system (i.e. once the interface has been implemented to integrate this mobile solution with the hospital
information system) is just another benefit of this solution. Furthermore, without the requirement for the
supporting network infrastructure this proposed solution will also be suitable for the remote regions of Australia
where the network availability is limited or unreliable.

CONCLUSION
Before the 6CPA was officially signed, there were concerns and various speculations regarding what the new
eligibility criteria will be for electronic prescription fees and how the subsidy will continue. Among them, eRx
persuaded users with the no cost policy even for non-eligible scripts. But, some of its publications mention that it
may not be able to maintain the cost neutral policy indefinitely but users would be given at least two month
notice prior to any change being implemented to the price structure ("eRx slashes e-script pricing", 2010;
O'Donoghue, 2012). So, effectively it does not even promise the users that it will remain cost neutral even with
the current Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 contribution for each electronic prescription. How the use eTP will
continue without the Commonwealth subsidy is rather an alarming thought. On the other hand, MediSecure
seems to try using a scare tactics on users by implying that the eligibility criteria for electronic prescription fees
will likely to be stricter in future ("How electronic prescription fee payment works?", 2015). For instance, from
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certain point in time during the 6CPA agreement period, the Commonwealth’s AU$ 0.15 subsidy will only be
applicable if the PES can share data with other eHealth components such as PCEHR and NPDR. From that
aspect, only their product, Script Vault, is capable of such enhancement with minimal disruption to the services
as it is the only PES service that fully complies with various eHealth and HL7 standards. When the 6CPA was
officially signed, the section 6.1.3 and Appendix B of the agreement state that from 1st July 2016 and onwards
this funding will be subject to a cost-effectiveness assessment by an independent health technology assessment
body as determined by the Minister ("The Pharmacy Guild of Australia", 2015). Therefore, instead of living in
fear of the potential change in the Commonwealth’s subsidy for the electronic prescription fees, this paper
proposed a cheaper (i.e. potentially cost-free) alternative with comparable security measures to the options
currently available.
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